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I. Introduction 
The political and legal campaign for marriage equality rests on 
the proposition that the Constitution of the United States requires 
communal recognition of committed, same-sex relationships. The 
text, structure, and history of the amended Constitution, however, 
support precisely the opposite conclusion: i.e., that neither the Unit-
ed States nor any state may compel any community, association, or 
individual to affirm (by word, deed, or policy) the hotly disputed 
propositions about human sexuality that lie at the core of the debate. 
Nor can it plausibly be argued that any part of the Constitution re-
quires any person, association, or polity to remain discreetly silent 
while progressive1 and LGBT positions on human sexuality become 
 
 1. The term “progressive” is used here in the sense used in James Davison Hunter, 
Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (1991). 
  To come right to the point, the cleavages at the heart of the contemporary cul-
ture war are created by what I would like to call the impulse toward orthodoxy and the 
impulse toward progressivism. The terms are imperfect, but each aspires to describe in 
shorthand a particular locus and source of moral truth, the fundamental (though 
perhaps subconscious) moral allegiances of the actors involved in the culture war as 
well as their cultural and political dispositions. Though the terms “orthodox” and 
“progressive” may be familiar to many, they have a particular meaning here that re-
quires some elaboration.  
  . . . . 
  . . . I prefer to use the terms orthodox and progressive as formal properties of a 
belief system or world view. What is common to all three [Jewish, Catholic, and 
Protestant] approaches to orthodoxy, for example (and what makes orthodoxy more of 
a formal property), is the commitment on the part of adherents to an external, definable, 
and transcendent authority. Such objective and transcendent authority defines, at least 
in the abstract, a consistent, unchangeable measure of value, purpose, goodness, and 
identity, both personal and collective. . . . 
  Within cultural progressivism, by contrast, moral authority tends to be defined 
by the spirit of the modern age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism. Progressivist 
moral ideals tend, that is, to derive from and embody (through rarely exhaust) that 
spirit. From this standpoint, truth tends to be viewed as a process, as a reality that is 
ever unfolding. . . . In other words, what all progressivist world views share in com-
mon is the tendency to resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing assumptions of 
contemporary life. 
  . . . . 
  . . . [P]ublic opinion surveys show that a decided majority of secularists are 
drawn toward the progressivist impulse in American culture. For these people reli-
gious tradition has no binding address, no opinion-shaping influence. Some secular-
ists, however, (particularly many secular conservative and neo-conservative intellec-
tuals) are drawn toward the orthodox impulse. 
Id. at 43–45 (footnotes omitted); see Brian Fitzpatrick, Culture & Media Inst., National 
Cultural Values Survey: America: A Nation in Moral and Spiritual Confusion (2006), 
http://nassaucivic.com/NationalCulturalValues.pdf. 
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the new orthodoxy in public policy, lest dissent—openly expressed by 
word or deed—be taken as conclusive evidence of intolerance, lack of 
social sophistication, “homophobia,” or actionable hostility. 
Part II explains how the same-sex-marriage debate is about far 
more than “achieving equality in some of the most basic elements of 
civic life, such as bereavement leave, health care benefits, pensions 
benefits, spousal support, name changes[,] and adoption.”2 The case 
law and commentary confirm that legal recognition of same-sex rela-
tionships as marriages is a key strategic objective in a much more am-
bitious and longer-term philosophical and political effort to decon-
struct and eliminate the “hetero-normativity” and “hetero-
patriarchy” of cultures rooted in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic re-
ligious traditions. In their place, advocates hope to build legal and so-
cial cultures in which sexual identity is viewed as a social construct, 
and the law is built around a regime of “intimate pluralism,” in which 
same-sex and alternative relationships command the same respect and 
moral status as monogamous, conjugal marriages.3 
Part III focuses on the two main arguments of advocates for legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage. The first argument is the analogy 
to race discrimination. This narrative asserts that the law should deal 
with sexual orientation in precisely the same way as race; that is, as an 
inherently irrational and immoral basis for differentiating conjugal 
 
  NCVS reveals that almost all the survey respondents, who are demographically 
representative of American adults as a whole, can be categorized in one of three val-
ues groups—Orthodox, Progressive, and Independent—and these demarcations are 
based on their views on the role of religion in everyday life. 
Fitzpatrick, supra exec. summary, at 1. 
  The Progressives, [seventeen] percent of the public, advocate a secularized ap-
proach to private and public life. They reject the notion that having deep religious 
beliefs is necessary for living a good and moral life. Progressives believe people 
should live their lives according to their own personal principles, even if those prin-
ciples contradict God’s teachings. They see morality in shades of gray: morality is 
situational, not absolute. They tend to think of themselves as the final authority, ra-
ther than God or the law. Progressives think government should not be allowed to 
apply religious principles. [Fifty-three] percent of Progressives say they believe in 
God, and [thirty-three] percent—four times the overall national figure of [eight] per-
cent—say they do not believe in God. 
Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
 2. Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) (2003), 65 O.R. 3d 161, 168 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
 3. The concept of “intimate pluralism” refers to “a constitutional order in which the 
Due Process Clause protects not only marriage, but also nonmarital sexual intimacy which ‘can 
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,’ but not within marriage.” Ariela 
R. Dubler, Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right to Marry, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 
1348, 1374 (2010) (footnote omitted) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)). 
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marriage from other sexual relationships. The second is a time-worn, 
but potent, argument that religious beliefs about human sexuality are 
nonrational and are, therefore, illegitimate sources for the construc-
tion of social norms. Employed in tandem, these two arguments con-
vey a powerful, albeit implicit, message that cultural norms built on 
the moral frameworks of the Abrahamic religions are inconsistent 
with modern concepts of human dignity.4 
Deconstructing those moral frameworks, however, requires more 
than a powerful message. The politics of California’s Proposition 8 is 
a case in point: A sustained effort to deconstruct those moral frame-
works on a national basis will require the coercive power, moral au-
thority, and legal resources of the federal government. 
Obtaining those resources requires two preliminary steps. The 
first step is a judicial decree holding that sexual orientation is an in-
herently suspect classification. By equating sexual orientation with 
race, such a development would confer a highly symbolic, moral sta-
tus on the effort. It would also justify the aggressive use of all of the 
enforcement powers of the modern administrative state in an effort 
similar to the effort to extirpate the nation’s legacy of racial discrimi-
nation. Dissenting individuals and culture-forming institutions would 
then be forced to make a Hobson’s choice5: Either provide symbolic 
affirmation of same-sex relationships or accept fines, penalties, or ex-
clusion from full participation in the civic life of the community. 
The second step is a Supreme Court decision that implies that 
“intimate pluralism” is the only view of human sexuality that passes 
constitutional muster under the First Amendment. Such a holding 
would “constitutionalize” the progressive position and provide a use-
ful tool to ensure that contrary views are marginalized or excluded 
from public space.6 
 
 4. See, e.g., id. (“The question at the heart of this appeal is whether excluding same-sex 
couples from another of the most basic elements of civic life—marriage—infringes human dig-
nity and violates the Canadian Constitution.”). 
 5. Hobson’s choice, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
hobson’s%20choice (last visited May 3, 2013) (defining Hobson’s choice as “the necessity of 
accepting one of two or more equally objectionable alternatives”). 
 6. See, e.g., Nampa Classical Acad. v. Goesling, 447 F. App’x 776 (9th Cir. 2011) (up-
holding a state policy that excluded primary religious texts, such as the Bible, the Qur’an, The 
Book of Mormon, the Hadith, and the Bhagavad Gita from a public charter school’s curricu-
lum). 
  
397] Public Affirmation of Same-Sex Marriage 
401 
Part IV discusses the contradictions that lie at the heart of the ar-
gument that the United States Constitution compels communities to 
confer equal status on same-sex or alternative, intimate relationships. 
It argues that protection for diversity was as much the object of the 
religious-freedom guarantee7 as it was the purpose of the Civil War 
and later political-equality amendments. A community’s decision to 
confer or withhold a privileged status is not mere taxonomy but ra-
ther the expression of a value judgment. The Equal Protection 
Clause does not authorize the judiciary to substitute its own value 
judgments for those of Congress and the People of the states unless 
the Constitution itself confers the contested status. 
This Article concludes by arguing that the federal government 
has no authority to deconstruct the moral culture of any community. 
The Constitution expressly prohibits any attempt to require an indi-
vidual or institutional dissenter to affirm, expressly or implicitly, ab-
horrent moral or religious views or behaviors. 
II. The Politics of Compelled Affirmation  
in the Marriage Debate 
A cursory review of the literature on same-sex marriage confirms 
that the debate over legal recognition is about far more than just 
marriage equality. It is “inextricably and famously intertwined with a 
parallel set of social and political debates about sexual politics and the 
meaning of marriage”8 that center on the perceived need to recognize 
and validate alternative relationships. Writing in a recent issue of the 
Georgetown Law Journal, Matthew S. Nosanchuck put it this way: 
 Ultimately, there is ample room in this discourse for developing 
or recognizing alternative forms of relationship recognition to mar-
riage. Marriage, however, now consistently overshadows all other 
forms of relationship recognition and has essentially rendered them 
as suboptimal options on the menu. Marriage has become the main-
 
 7. The religious-liberty guarantee is a concept that includes not only the Religion 
Clause of the First Amendment but also the No Religious Test Clause of Article VI, the Quali-
fications Clauses for Senators, Members of Congress, and the President; the Free Speech, Free 
Press, Peaceable Assembly, and Petition Clauses of the First Amendment; and Sections 1 and 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. For an extended discussion of the concept, see Robert A. De-
stro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J.L. & Religion 355 (1995); see also 
Robert A. Destro, By What Right?”: The Sources and Limits of Federal Court and Congressional Ju-
risdiction over Matters “Touching Religion,” 29 Ind. L. Rev. 1 (1995). 
 8. Dubler, supra note 3, at 1349. 
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stay, and while LGBT advocates would not necessarily reject these 
other forms of relationship recognition, a consensus has evolved within 
the LGBT, progressive, and civil-libertarian communities around mar-
riage equality as the ultimate objective and the measure of full support for 
LGBT civil rights. . . . 
 Indeed, the debate over marriage equality has come to be less 
about the bundle of specific legal rights and obligations that accom-
pany marriage and much more about the symbolic importance of mar-
riage and the values that underlie support for marriage equality.9 
If symbolic affirmation of the equal moral status of same-sex and 
alternative intimate relationships is the ultimate goal, we must now 
turn to examine the propositions that citizens and associations will be 
expected to affirm to demonstrate their “measure of full support for 
LGBT civil rights.”10 
A. The Dispute over the Nature of Human Sexuality: Is it a Social 
Construct, a Function of Biology, or Both? 
At the heart of the debate over the legal status of same-sex un-
ions11 lies an extended and unresolved argument about the nature, 
purpose, and meaning of human sexuality. Even a cursory review of 
the now-voluminous literature on the topic demonstrates that the 
debate over same-sex marriage is a proxy for profoundly political disa-
greements over basic biological, social, moral, and cultural categories. 
 
 9. Mathew S. Nosanchuk, Response: No Substitutions, Please, 100 Geo. L.J. 1989, 2007–
08 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 10. Id. The acronym LGBT—Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender—is used here as 
shorthand to describe a collection of groups within a community that describes itself, variously, 
as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered, transsexual, queer, and questioning (GLBTTQ). For 
purposes of this Article, I have adopted the term used generally in the literature. “Transgender 
is an umbrella term for persons whose gender identity, gender expression, or behavior does not 
conform to that typically associated with the sex to which they were assigned at birth.” Am. 
Psychological Ass’n, Answers to Your Questions About Transgender People, Gender 
Identity, and Gender Expression (2011), http://bit.ly/apa-trans (emphasis omitted). 
 11. For purposes of this discussion, the term “same-sex union” refers to a union on 
which the state has conferred the status of marriage, or to any other union of two persons of the 
same sex that presumes a sexual relationship, such as a “civil union,” and on which the state has 
conferred a status that is the functional equivalent of marriage. 
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1. Affirming the proposition that human sexual preference and gender are 
social constructs 
The argument for marriage equality rests on the proposition that 
sexual preference and gender are socially constructed—“that is, as 
powerfully shaped by social and cultural forces in addition to biologi-
cal and psychological factors.”12 This perspective views 
both sexuality and gender not as something that people “are,” but 
something that they “do”—that is, that they accomplish in social in-
teraction. Individuals develop identities as sexual beings by (more or 
less consciously) continuously assessing their desires, adopting (or 
rejecting) particular attitudes, and engaging in (and revising) various 
practices. Likewise, they become gendered through ongoing exper-
iments with gender rules—conforming to some, breaking others—
assessing others’ reactions, and adapting their gender performances 
accordingly. 
 Although analytically distinct, sexuality and gender are intimate-
ly interrelated, mutually constructed in distinctive ways in specific 
social and historical locations.13 
A review of the commentary on the marriage debate within the 
LGBT community has “long demonstrated [that] an intersecting set 
of legal and social arguments makes it nearly impossible to character-
ize the politics of advocating for a more capacious right to marry.”14 
For some, “[a]ccess to marriage is . . . about equal access to a power-
ful legal institution that grants both numerous concrete rights, as well 
as myriad forms of social privilege.”15 For others, marriage is “an in-
stitution with a venerable pedigree of exclusion and hierarchy”16 that 
stigmatizes “those who do not wish to order their intimate lives with-
in marriage’s normative structures.”17 The common thread, however, 
 
 12. Laura M. Carpenter, Like a Virgin . . . Again?: Secondary Virginity as an Ongoing Gen-
dered Social Construction, 15 Sexuality & Culture 115, 118 (2011). 
 13. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
 14. Dubler, supra note 3, at 1349. 
 15. Id. at 1349 & n.2 (citing sources). 
 16. Id. at 1349 & n.3 (citing sources). In this view, the status of marriage grants legitima-
cy to some relationships and necessarily marginalizes others. See, e.g., Michael Warner, The 
Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life 81–82 (1999). 
 17. Dubler, supra note 3, at 1350. For a succinct statement of this position, see, for ex-
ample, Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Mar-
riage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 Va. L. Rev. 1535, 
1549 (1993) (“Advocating lesbian and gay marriage will detract from, even contradict, efforts to 
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is that both approaches seek to “combat sexual moralism and to ame-
liorate the full range of hardships faced by persons associated with 
marginal gender or sexual identities or practices.”18 
In this view, laws and social structures that embody and preserve 
the traditional meanings of marriage, family, sex, gender, and sexuali-
ty rest on society’s largely unconscious and deeply “insidious” prefer-
ence for heterosexual relationships. At best, social and legal prefer-
ences for heterosexual relationships (“heterophilia”)19 are 
“irrational.”20 At worst, traditional views are the foundations upon 
which deeply engrained and legally sanctioned “anti-homosexual hos-
tility” (“homophobia”) is built and sustained.21 The result is a form of 
 
unhook economic benefits from marriage and make basic health care and other necessities 
available to all. It will also require a rhetorical strategy that emphasizes similarities between our 
relationships and heterosexual marriages, values long-term monogamous coupling above all 
other relationships, and denies the potential of lesbian and gay marriage to transform the gen-
dered nature of marriage for all people.”). 
 18. Libby Adler, The Gay Agenda, 16 Mich. J. Gender & L. 147, 148 (2009); see, e.g., 
Ariela R. Dubler, From Mclaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the Road 
to Marriage, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1165, 1187 (2006) (“If cases like McLaughlin and Lawrence are 
understood exclusively as points on the long road to marriage, we lose sight of the possibility 
that, for some people, the right to engage in sex outside of marriage might be as significant as 
the right to enter into a legal marriage.”). 
 19. See generally Zvi Triger, Discriminating Speech: On the Heterophilia of Freedom of Speech 
Doctrine, 19 Cardozo J.L. & Gender (forthcoming fall 2013), http://bit.ly/heterophilia   
(discussing David Schwartz, Heterophilia – The Love that Dare Not Speak Its Aim: Commentary on 
Trop and Stolorow’s “Defense Analysis in Self Psychology: A Developmental View,” 
3 Psychoanalytic Dialogues 643, 647 (1993); Jeffrey L. Trop & Robert D. Stolorow, De-
fense Analysis in Self Psychology: A Developmental View, 2 Psychoanalytic Dialogues 427, 433 
(1992)). In Triger’s view: 
To be sure, it is not easy to draw the line between homophobia and heterophilia, and 
many heterophile actions can be interpreted as unconsciously homophobic. Howev-
er, generally speaking, laws that privilege predominantly heterosexual institutions, 
such as marriage, are heterophile in nature, while laws that restrict LGBTs, discrim-
inate against them or punish them as such, would be labeled as homophobic. Thus, 
laws privileging married couples and awarding them forms of protection that unmar-
ried couples cannot receive, are heterophile as long as LGBTs cannot get married, 
and, probably, as long as they do not extend those privileges to all couples, married 
and unmarried. 
Id. at 7 (footnote omitted). 
 20. Compare Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (“These constitutional 
challenges have in common the assertion that the right to marry without regard to the sex of 
the parties is a fundamental right of all persons and that restricting marriage to only couples of 
the opposite sex is irrational and invidiously discriminatory.”) (rejecting the claim), with 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“For the reasons we 
explain below, we conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either 
due process or equal protection.”). 
 21. E.g., Gregory M. Herek, Beyond “Homophobia”: Thinking About Sexual Prejudice and 
Stigma in the Twenty-First Century, 1 Sexuality Res. & Soc. Pol’y 6, 7 & n.3 (2004); see also 
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legally sanctioned oppression22 that creates and sustains actionable 
harm both to individuals23 and to society as a whole.24 
2. Affirming monogamous, conjugal marriage25 
On the other side of this argument are those individuals and asso-
ciations who seek to preserve and defend not only the traditional def-
inition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman,26 but 
also the constitutional authority of communities to make and act up-
on the value judgments supporting the distinctions that cultures use 
 
Raj Ayyar, Interview, George Weinberg: Love Is Conspiratorial, Deviant & Magical, GayToday 
(Nov. 1, 2002), http://www.gaytoday.com/interview/110102in.asp. 
 22. See also David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal 
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447, 490–91 (1996) (“If the law of mar-
riage can be seen as facilitating the opportunities of two people to live an emotional life that 
they find satisfying—rather than as imposing a view of proper relationships—the law ought to 
be able to achieve the same for units of more than two. . . . By ceasing to conceive of marriage 
as a partnership composed of one person of each sex, the state may become more receptive to 
units of three or more (all of which, of course, include at least two persons of the same sex) and 
to units composed of two people of the same sex but who are bound by friendship alone.”). 
 23. Johns v. Derby City Council, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 375 (Eng. & Wales) (holding 
that a Christian couple’s “antipathy, objection to or disapproval of, homosexuality and same-sex 
relationships” made them ineligible to serve as foster parents in the United Kingdom). 
 24. See, e.g., Ladele v. London Borough of Islingon and Liberty, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357 
(Court of Appeal from the Employment Division), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/ 
EWCA/Civ/2009/1357.html (holding that a public employee who held “the orthodox Christian 
view that marriage is the union of one man and one woman for life,” and who “could not rec-
oncile her faith with taking an active part in enabling same sex unions to be formed” could be 
terminated under a municipal policy that provided that “[a]ll employees are expected to pro-
mote [the Borough’s] values at all times and to work with [its] policy” regarding affirmation of 
same-sex unions). But see Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty 
Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 206, 207 (2010) (arguing that religious-
liberty claims should be accommodated for the same reasons that are used to accommodate 
same-sex-marriage claims: i.e., that “same-sex couples and religious believers claim that their 
conduct stems from commitments central to their identity—love and fidelity to a life partner, 
faithfulness to the moral norms of God—and that they should be able to live these commit-
ments in a public way, touching all aspects of their lives”). 
 25. The term “conjugal” refers to the relationship of husband and wife. See Conjugal, 
Oxford Dictionaries, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/conjugal (last visited 
May 17, 2013) (“relating to marriage or the relationship between husband and wife”). Strictly 
speaking, the phrase “conjugal marriage” is redundant (i.e., a “marriage marriage”), but for 
purposes of the present discussion, it is used to describe a monogamous relationship between a 
husband and a wife. 
 26. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, Speaking Up for Marriage, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
915, 915 (quoting President George W. Bush, The President’s Radio Address, 40 Weekly 
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1253, 1253-54 (July 10, 2004) (“If courts create their own arbitrary defini-
tion of marriage as a mere legal contract and cut marriage off from its cultural, religious, and 
natural roots, then the meaning of marriage is lost and the institution is weakened.”)). 
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to distinguish and regulate human sexual behaviors.27 Like their po-
litical opponents, they recognize that the battle is basically a contest 
over who has the authority to control the most important symbols of 
the dominant culture, and thus to define its content. 
The cultural divide between the two camps could not be more 
profound. In a January 2012 “Open Letter to All Americans,” thirty-
nine leaders of thirty-three American religious communities resound-
ingly reaffirmed the unequivocal teaching of most religious groups on 
marriage and family life: 
The meaning of marriage precedes and transcends any particular 
society, government, or religious community. It is a universal good 
and the foundational institution of all societies. It is bound up with 
the nature of the human person as male and female, and with the 
essential task of bearing and nurturing children.28 
Like their political opponents, those who take this more “conven-
tional” view are a diverse lot. Opponents of same-sex marriage can be 
found at every point along the spectrum of political, cultural, philo-
sophical, and religious belief.29 Some argue that all sexual relations 
outside of marriage are to be avoided,30 while others base their sup-
 
 27. See Kevin J. Worthen, Who Decides and What Difference Does it Make?: Defining Mar-
riage in “Our Democratic, Federal Republic,” 18 BYU J. Pub. L. 273, 273–74 (2004). 
 28. Open Letter from U.S. Religious Leaders to All Americans, Marriage and Religious 
Freedom: Fundamental Goods that Stand or Fall Together (Jan. 12, 2012), http://bit.ly/Open-
Letter (signed by 39 leaders of 33 religious communities). 
 29. See Behind Gay Marriage Momentum, Regional Gaps Persist, Pew Res. Ctr. for Peo-
ple & Press (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/09/behind-gay-marriage-
momentum-regional-gaps-persist; Gay Marriage & Homosexuality, Pew F. on Religion & Pub. 
Life, http://www.pewforum.org/Topics/Issues/Gay-Marriage-and-Homo sexuality (last visited 
May 18, 2013). 
 30. See, e.g., Ch 3. The Islamic Sexual Morality: Its Structure, in Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, 
Marriage and Morals in Islam (1990), available at http://bit.ly/IslamMorals; Sacred Con-
gregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Persona Humana: Declaration on Certain 
Questions Regarding Sexual Ethics (Dec. 29, 1975), http://bit.ly/PersonaHumana; Darren 
E. Sherkat, Kylan Mattias de Vries & Stacia Creek, Race, Religion, and Opposition to Same-Sex 
Marriage, 91 Soc. Sci. Q. 80 (2010) (discussing the differences among religious and ethnic 
groups on the issue of same-sex marriage); Christina Lee Knauss, African Methodist Episcopal 
Church Unanimously Rejects Same-Sex Unions, Free Republic (July 9, 2004), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-religion/1168649/posts. 
To the extent that religious groups condemn homosexual behavior, it follows that affir-
mation of same-sex marriage would be impossible. See Catechism of the Catholic Church 
§§ 2357–2358 (condemning “unjust discrimination” against persons with homosexual orienta-
tion, but noting that condemning homosexual acts cannot be approved under any circumstances 
because they are “intrinsically disordered,” and are “contrary to the natural law” because “[t]hey 
close the sexual act to the gift of life” and “do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual 
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port for the preference for the monogamous, conjugal relationship in 
the orderly development of children, society, and the culture as a 
whole. 
Opposition to behaviors commonly included in the concepts of 
“alternative sexual arrangements” and “intimate pluralism” is even 
more broadly based.31 Any attempt by government to compel social 
acceptance of these behaviors would meet with equally substantial re-
sistance.32 Policies that assume the social “construction” of sexual and 
gender identity and “sexual orientation” are even more controversial 
because of both the highly charged nature of the debate33 and the un-
 
complementarity”); Rizvi, supra; Bonnie J. Morris, Challenge, Criticism and Compassion: Modern 
Jewish Responses to Jewish Homosexuals, 49 Jewish Soc. Stud. 283 (1987). 
 31. Among alternative sexual relationships and “intimate pluralism” are various forms of 
“marriage”: polygamy (marriages involving more than two people); polygyny (one male marry-
ing multiple females); polyandry (one female marrying multiple males); polygamous marriages 
with more than one spouse of each sex or with marriages between persons of the same sex; in-
formal, non-marital relationships that fall under the general rubric of polyamory, which in-
cludes sexual relationships among partners of various sexes that are maintained by negotiation 
and do not necessarily involve marriage; and “sex work.” See Sex Work: Writings by Women 
in the Sex Industry (Frédérique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 2d ed. 1998); Michèle 
Alexandre, Big Love: Is Feminist Polygamy an Oxymoron or a True Possibility?, 18 Hastings 
Women’s L.J. 3 (2007); Andrew F. March, Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and 
Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification, 8 J. Moral Phil. 246, 246 (2011) (“argu[ing] 
that the four most plausible arguments compatible with public reason for an outright legal ban 
on all forms of polygamy are unvictorious”); Gregg Strauss, Is Polygamy Inherently Unequal?, 122 
Ethics 516 (2012); Jessica Bennett, Only You. And You. And You. Polyamory—Relationships with 
Multiple, Mutually Consenting Partners—Has a Coming-out Party, Newsweek (July 28, 2009, 8:00 
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/07/28/only-you-and-you-and-you.html. 
 32. See Lara Denis, From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant, 63 Phil. & Phenomeno-
logical Res. 1 (2001); Michael E. Nielsen & Ryan T. Cragun, Religious Orientation, Religious 
Affiliation, and Boundary Maintenance: The Case of Polygamy, 13 Mental Health, Religion & 
Culture 761, 766–67 (2010) (“The present data are consistent with the finding that alternative 
sexual and marital arrangements may generate differential treatment because of their implicit 
challenge to family structure. Our findings also illustrate the connection between polygamy and 
alternative sexual practices. Except among polygamists, attitudes toward alternative sexual prac-
tices is [sic] a significant predictor of attitudes toward polygamy.” (citation omitted)); Phebe 
Tucker et al., Assessing Changes in Medical Student Attitudes Toward Non-Traditional Human Sex-
ual Behaviors Using a Confidential Audience Response System, 10 Sex Educ. 37 (2010). 
 33. There is considerable scientific agreement on the descriptive goals of the terminolo-
gy, but there is considerably less agreement concerning the uses to which these terms are put. 
  Particular terms may be defined differently by various authors, so it may be 
helpful to begin by defining those terms as they will be used here. Sex will be used to 
refer to the biological variables that can be described as either male or female (e.g., 
genes, chromosomes, gonads, internal and external genital structures), while gender 
will refer to social categories (e.g., man or woman, boy or girl) or factors related to 
living in the social role of a man or a woman. Gender identity refers to one’s sense of 
belonging to the male or female gender category, while gender role refers to behaviors 
(mannerisms, style of dress, activities etc.) that convey to others one’s membership in 
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certainty of the science.34 Litigation over policies based on these as-
sumptions is ongoing.35 
 
one of those categories. Sexual orientation refers to one’s pattern of erotic responsive-
ness and will be described here as androphilic (attracted to men), gynephilic (attracted 
to women), or bisexual (attracted to both). 
William Byne, Developmental Endocrine Influences on Gender Identity: Implications for Management 
of Disorders of Sex Development,73 Mount Sinai J. Med. 950, 950 (2006); Meredith L. Chivers 
et al., A Sex Difference in the Specificity of Sexual Arousal, 15 Psychol. Sci. 736 (2004). 
The literature suggests that there may be significant differences in men and women. 
While measuring sexual orientation of men is relatively straightforward, the same measures do 
not produce significant results when used to measure sexual orientation in women. As a result, 
research “suggest[s] that sexual arousal patterns play fundamentally different roles in male and 
female sexuality.” Chivers et al., supra, at 736. Dr. Bailey provided the following explanation of 
the discrepancy: 
I think that it’s important to distinguish a number of very related traits so that we 
know what we’re talking about here. 
  Sexual identity is what you call yourself—gay, straight, bisexual, and so on. Sexu-
al behavior is who you have sex with—men or women, or both. And these differ, ob-
viously. And then there’s sexual preference. And by “sexual preference,” I mean what 
sex you prefer to have sex with, for whatever reason. For whatever reason. And you 
might prefer to have sex with—say, a man might prefer to have sex with women, 
even though he’s more attracted to men, for moral and religious reasons. That would 
be a sexual preference for him. 
  . . . In men, anyway, sexual orientation is directed sexual arousal pattern that 
can be measured objectively—although not perfectly, with error. . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . Women are different. Women are very different. . . . They may not even 
have something like a sexual orientation. I think that my view right now is that, in 
general, women don’t have a sexual orientation. That’s not to say that they don’t 
have sexual preference. Women have strong preferences. But it’s not due to an 
arousal pattern. 
Michael J. Bailey, Northwestern Univ., Remarks during panel discussion on Sexual Orienta-
tion, Gay Marriage, and Child Well-Being: Understanding the Social and Behavioral Science 
Debate 9–10, 16–17 (Dec. 11, 2006), http://bit.ly/MichaelBailey. 
 34. “Sexual differentiation” is an enormous topic beyond the scope of this paper, but it is 
relevant here because the initial “construction” of sex and gender are unquestionably accom-
plished by nature: i.e. one’s genetic makeup. The field of neuroscience is developing rapidly, 
and there is considerable difference of opinion on how to interpret the results of the emergent 
findings. See Byne, supra note 33, at 956 (“The current dominance of the hormonal theory of 
sexual differentiation may give the impression that gonadal secretions are fully responsible for 
all aspects of brain sexual differentiation. Recent work, primarily in animals, however, suggests 
that XX and XY brain cells behave differently, in part, because of the cell-autonomous actions 
of X and Y genes.”); Cordelia Fine, From Scanner to Sound Bite: Issues in Interpreting and Report-
ing Sex Differences in the Brain, 19 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 280, 281 (2010) (noting 
“the importance of not placing too much confidence in any single functional or structural neu-
roimaging study that seems to demonstrate a sex difference”); Olaf Hiort, Ute Thyen & Paul-
Martin Holterhus, The Basis of Gender Assignment in Disorders of Somatosexual Differentiation, 64 
Hormone Res. 18 (2005) (abstract), http://www.biomedsearch.com/nih/basis-gender-
assignment-in-disorders/16286765.html (“There is increasing evidence that genital develop-
ment is dependent on the action of androgenic steroids; moreover, both androgens and oestro-
gens may have an impact on other developing organs including neuronal structures such as the 
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B. Questioning the Science: The Politics of Expert Opinion 
This is neither the time nor the setting in which to consider the 
debate within the natural-, biological-, or social-science communities 
concerning the social or physical “construction” of human sexuality. 
Nor is it an appropriate venue for discussing the relative merits of the 
research that the courts are being asked to rely on in pending cases 
challenging the constitutionality of limiting the concept of “mar-
riage” to the union of one man and one woman. What is relevant 
here is the nature of the dispute over the research. 
To say that the dispute is “rancorous” would be an understate-
ment. The recent example of University of Texas Sociology Profes-
sor, Dr. Mark Regnerus, is a case in point. His recent study36 has 
generated a firestorm of protest from angry supporters of same-sex 
parenting. A recent interview of Dr. Regnerus in Christianity Today 
begins with the following statement: 
 The survey, known as the New Family Structures Study (NFSS), 
is remarkable in its scope. It’s a random national sample, considered 
“the gold standard” of social science surveys. NFSS measures the 
economic, relational, political, and psychological effects on adults 
ages 18 to 39 who grew up in families where the father or mother 
engaged in homosexual behavior. Despite Regnerus’s repeated cau-
 
brain. Long-term outcome studies on the various intersexuality disorders are desperately need-
ed in order to establish a basis for evidence-based medicine regarding sex assignment and 
treatment options.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681 (9th Cir., filed Dec. 21, 2012) (granting 
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of California Senate Bill 1172), 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000635. 
Scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 2013, California Senate Bill 1172 adds Sections 
865 to 865.2 to the California Business & Professions Code. Section 865.1 provides that “Under 
no circumstances shall a mental health provider engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a 
patient under 18 years of age.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 865.1 (2013) (emphasis added). 
Section 865(b)(1) defines “Sexual orientation change efforts” as “any practices by mental 
health providers that seek to change an individual’s sexual orientation. This includes efforts to 
change behaviors or gender expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions 
or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.” Id. § 865(b)(1). The definition excludes psycho-
therapies that “provide acceptance, support, and understanding of clients or the facilitation of 
clients’ coping, social support, and identity exploration and development” as well as “efforts” 
that “do no seek to change sexual orientation.” Id. § 865(b)(2). Section 865.2 provides that “Any 
sexual orientation change efforts attempted on a patient under 18 years of age by a mental 
health provider shall be unprofessional conduct and shall subject a mental health provider to 
discipline by the licensing entity for that mental health provider.” Id. § 865.2. 
 36. Mark Regnerus, How Different are the Adult Children of Parents Who Have Same-Sex 
Relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures Study, 41 Soc. Sci. Res. 752 (2012). 
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tion that the NFSS does not account for stable same-sex marriages 
(since same-sex marriage as such didn’t exist when the survey par-
ticipants were children), he has undergone professional censure. So-
cial Science Research conducted an internal audit on the peer-review 
process of the NFSS, and the University of Texas at Austin investi-
gated Regnerus following allegations of “scientific misconduct.” 
(The school has since cleared Regnerus of the allegations.)37 
The University of Texas was, to be sure, required to look into 
any credible claims that Dr. Regnerus had violated professional ethi-
cal and research norms, but the report filed by the University’s Re-
search Compliance Officer tells a story that raises serious First and 
Fifth Amendment concerns. Addressing the origin of the complaint 
filed, the Compliance Officer notes that: “In brief, [Complainant] be-
lieved that the Regnerus research was seriously flawed and inferred 
that there must be scientific misconduct.”38 As the University found: 
Whether the research designed and conducted by Professor Regne-
rus and reported in Social Science Research possessed significant limi-
tations or was even perhaps seriously flawed is a determination that 
should be left to debates that are currently underway in the acade-
my and future research that validates or invalidates his findings.39 
The First Amendment issues can be briefly stated: Because there 
is no consensus40 (and, according to Regnerus himself, not enough 
evidence) to draw solid conclusions about the effects of same-sex par-
enting on the adjustment of adult children raised in stable, same-sex 
relationships,41 freedom of speech and academic inquiry require that 
 
 37. Katelyn Beaty, The Regnerus Affair, Christianity Today (Sept. 28, 2012, 4:41 PM), 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/october/mark-regnerus-interview-gay-parenting-
study.html. 
 38. Memorandum from Robert A. Peterson, Research Integrity Officer, Univ. of Tex., 
to Steven W. Leslie, Exec. Vice President & Provost, Univ. of Tex. 3 (Aug. 24, 2012) [hereafter 
UT Research Integrity Inquiry], http://www.utexas.edu/opa/wordpress/news/files/Regnerus-
Inquiry-Report.pdf. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Walter R. Schumm, Methodological Decisions and the Evaluation of Possible Ef-
fects of Different Family Structures on Children: The New Family Structures Survey (NFSS), 41 Soc. 
Sci. Res. 1357, 1357 (2012) (“Even though the apparent outcomes of Regnerus’s study were 
unpopular, the methodological decisions he made in the design and implementation of the New 
Family Structures Survey were not uncommon among social scientists, including many progres-
sive, gay and lesbian scholars. These decisions and the research they produced deserve consid-
erable and continued discussion, but criticisms of the underlying ethics and professionalism are 
misplaced because nearly every methodological decision that was made has ample precedents in 
research published by many other credible and distinguished scholars.”). 
 41. Mark Regnerus, Queers As Folk: Does It Really Make No Difference If Your Parents Are 
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the researcher be left alone by public authorities until “future re-
search . . . validates or invalidates his findings.” 
The important point, for present purposes, is the issue of com-
pelled affirmation. The white-hot response to the Regnerus study 
tells us that there is a “politically correct” way to approach the re-
search data. Raise serious concerns, even imperfectly, or express one’s 
opinion that same-sex marriage ought not to be recognized, or 
(worse) combine both of these positions with traditional religious be-
liefs on sexual ethics, and one’s credibility as a research scholar is 
open to serious question. Dr. Darren Sherkat, the Social Science Re-
search editorial board member assigned to “audit” the Regnerus 
study, attacked its peer reviewers because “The peers are right wing 
Christianists!”42 
The due-process issues arise because the record is unsettled, and 
because both sides of the debate file voluminous amicus briefs with 
the courts in an effort to convince the judges of the wisdom and ve-
racity of their respective positions regarding the facts. In the case of 
same-sex parenting, the conventional wisdom posits that there is “no 
difference” (i.e., “null hypothesis”) between the adjustment levels of 
children raised by heterosexual and same-sex parents. Even if we as-
sume, for purposes of argument, that the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation’s 2005 Position Statement is correct, and that when it was 
published, “no research ha[d] shown that the children raised by lesbi-
ans and gay men are less well-adjusted than those reared within het-
erosexual relationships,”43 a court may not accept such a fact as hav-
ing been established. Rudimentary notions of due process require 
that the qualifications of experts and the substance of their work must 
be subject to cross examination,44 and judges may not take judicial 
notice of disputed facts unless they are “not subject to reasonable dis-
pute” because “generally known within the trial court’s territorial ju-
 
Straight or Gay?, Slate (June 11, 2012, 6:02 AM), http://slate.me/1bmWYsk. 
 42. Scott Rose, BOMBSHELL: Editor Darren Sherkat Admits Peer Review Failure of Inva-
lid, Anti-Gay Regnerus Study, New C.R. Movement (July 27, 2012), http://bit.ly/11a5WF6. 
Scott Rose was the complaining party in the investigation of Dr. Regnerus’s study. See UT Re-
search Integrity Inquiry, supra, note 38, at 1. 
 43. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement on Support of Legal Recog-
nition of Same-Sex Civil Marriage (2005), http://bit.ly/APA-position; Brief for Am. Psycho-
logical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and Supporting Affirmance at 
21, Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Nos. 12-15388, 12-15409 (9th Cir. July 10, 2012), 
http://bit.ly/APA-amicusbrief. 
 44. Fed. R. Evid. 702–705. 
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risdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”45 
III. The Nature of the Dispute 
There is an obvious—and profound—moral disagreement be-
tween advocates and opponents of legal recognition of same-sex rela-
tionships. Because proponents believe that “both sexuality and gender 
[are] not . . . something that people ‘are,’ but [rather] something that 
they ‘do’—that is, that they accomplish in social interaction,”46 the 
quest for recogntion necessarily requires a re-evaluation of the social 
morality of laws, institutions, and social structures that regulate or 
condemn the types of conduct that express a person’s unique sexual 
or “gendered” identity.47 If respect for human dignity requires ac-
ceptance of those behaviors, it also requires a public policy that af-
firms them through both formal recognition and an active effort to 
suppress individual and institutional expression or conduct that con-
veys “a message of disapproval.”48 The California Supreme Court put 
the issue this way: 
[F]or a number of reasons we conclude that in the present context, 
affording same-sex couples access only to the separate institution of 
 
 45. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 
 46. Carpenter, supra, note 12. 
 47. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of 
“Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 
212 (1995) (“Native Americans . . . did not conflate official birth sex with gender in a deductive, 
intransitive manner . . . ; native gender was not merely the performance of official birth sex. 
Consequently, the native [Zuni] sex/gender system allowed each individual a high degree of 
autonomy and flexibility over gender, and generally facilitated sex/gender diversities based on 
personalized ability and appearance.” (footnote omitted)). 
  This rough sense of equality, coupled with non-conflationary alignments of sex 
and gender, also allowed a great deal of freedom for variated and individuated ex-
pressions of sexuality, regardless of sex or sexual orientation: because sex fixed nei-
ther gender nor destiny, because active/passive themes and traditions did not under-
lie native sex/gender arrangements, and because in this scheme sexuality was not 
elemental to gender, neither cross-sex nor same-sex relations could claim intrinsic 
superiority over the other. In this way, native cultures also avoided the heterosexism 
that is endemic to Euro-American sex/gender arrangements specifically under Leg 
Two of the conflation. 
Id. at 214 (footnotes omitted). 
 48. See, e.g., Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 464 F. 
Supp. 2d 938 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d en banc, 624 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing a claim 
that the City and County of San Francisco violated the Establishment Clause by adopting a 
formal resolution condemning the Catholic Church’s teachings on homosexuality). 
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domestic partnership, and denying such couples access to the estab-
lished institution of marriage, properly must be viewed as imping-
ing upon the right of those couples to have their family relationship ac-
corded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the family relationship of 
opposite-sex couples. 
 First, because of the long and celebrated history of the term 
“marriage” and the widespread understanding that this term de-
scribes a union unreservedly approved and favored by the commu-
nity, there clearly is a considerable and undeniable symbolic im-
portance to this designation. . . .  
 Second, particularly in light of the historic disparagement of and 
discrimination against gay persons, there is a very significant risk 
that retaining a distinction in nomenclature with regard to this most 
fundamental of relationships whereby the term “marriage” is denied 
only to same-sex couples inevitably will cause the new parallel insti-
tution that has been made available to those couples to be viewed as 
of a lesser stature than marriage and, in effect, as a mark of second-
class citizenship. . . .  
 Third, it also is significant that although the meaning of the 
term “marriage” is well understood by the public generally, the sta-
tus of domestic partnership is not.49 
Religious believers who convey individual and collective messages 
of disapproval are, from this perspective, those who would maintain 
“traditionalist androcentric and heterocentric biases in law and socie-
ty” and “legitimize and foster the elevation of masculinity over femi-
ninity as well as the elevation of heterosexuality over all other forms 
of sexuality.”50 To the extent that public officials and judges sub-
scribe to the view “that religion lies at the heart of the hostility and 
violence directed at gays and lesbians,”51 it follows that religious be-
 
 49. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 445–46 (Cal. 2008) (emphasis added). 
 50. Valdes, supra note 47, at 125. Professor Valdes defines “androsexism” as “the kind of 
‘sexism’ biased in favor of ‘male’-identified concepts, ideals, or constructions; “heterosexism” as 
“belief systems biased in favor of cross-sex social and sexual arrangements, or ‘heterosexuality’”; 
and “hetero-patriarchy” as “the fusion of androsexism and heterosexism, both socially and sex-
ually, to obtain and maintain the supremacy of ‘masculinity’ and of ‘masculine’-identified (het-
erosexual) men, over personal, economic, and cultural life.” Id. at 8 nn. 12–14. 
 51. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Per-
ry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
786 (2012), Judge Walker summarizes the testimony of Paul Nathanson, a researcher at 
McGill’s Faculty for Religious Studies: “Nathanson testified at his deposition that religion lies 
at the heart of the hostility and violence directed at gays and lesbians and that there is no evi-
dence that children raised by same-sex couples fare worse than children raised by opposite-sex 
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liefs—and, by implication, the religiously motivated voters who hold 
them—must be viewed “as the chief obstacle to gay and lesbian polit-
ical advances.”52 
This is no ordinary political dispute. Advocates for the LGBT 
community and other supporters of same-sex marriage have long ar-
gued that “fear,” not reason or experience, is the foundation of tradi-
tional religious beliefs about homosexual behavior and family rela-
tionships. Dr. Gregory Herek, one of the lead witnesses in the 
district-court hearing in Perry,53 has written that psychologist George 
Weinberg coined the term “homophobia” to make that very point: 
I coined the word homophobia to mean it was a phobia about ho-
mosexuals. . . . It was a fear of homosexuals which seemed to be as-
sociated with a fear of contagion, a fear of reducing the things one 
fought for—home and family. It was a religious fear and it had led to 
great brutality as fear always does.54 
Nor is this an ordinary constitutional dispute. If traditional views 
about the nature of marriage and sexual ethics are based on religious-
ly grounded fears, rather than on good-faith differences of opinion, 
the Constitution requires both courts and public officials to take af-
firmative steps to ensure that laws, policies, and practices grounded in 
such fears—like racial discrimination—“be eliminated root and 
branch.”55  
In Varnum v. Brien,56 the Iowa Supreme Court unanimously 
agreed: “Consequently, we address the religious undercurrent pro-
pelling the same-sex marriage debate as a means to fully explain our 
 
couples.” Id. at 945. 
 52. Id. at 937. 
  Political scientist Gary Segura provided many examples of ways in which pri-
vate discrimination against gays and lesbians is manifested in laws and policies. Se-
gura testified that negative stereotypes about gays and lesbians inhibit political com-
promise with other groups: “It’s very difficult to engage in the give-and-take of the 
legislative process when I think you are an inherently bad person. That’s just not the 
basis for compromise and negotiation in the political process.” Segura identified reli-
gion as the chief obstacle to gay and lesbian political advances. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 53. Id. at 921. 
 54. Herek, supra note 21 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ayyar, supra note 21. 
 55. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968) (“School boards such as the 
respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with 
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in 
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”). 
 56. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
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rationale for rejecting the dual-gender requirement of the marriage 
statute.”57 
The court was blunt: “[R]eligious opposition to same-sex mar-
riage” is the real, though unstated,“reason for the exclusion of gay 
and lesbian couples from civil marriage.”58 
While unexpressed, religious sentiment most likely motivates many, 
if not most, opponents of same-sex civil marriage and perhaps even 
shapes the views of those people who may accept gay and lesbian 
unions but find the notion of same-sex marriage unsettling.59 
Such a situation is, in the court’s view, intolerable. While it 
acknowledged that “such views are not the only religious views of 
marriage” and that “other equally sincere groups and people in Iowa 
and around the nation have strong religious views that yield the op-
posite conclusion,”60 it is the “undercurrent” of religious opposition 
that creates the constitutional problem.  
After Varnum, a claim that a law or policy is rooted in religious 
belief requires an Iowa judge to determine whether state legislation 
expresses “religious views, either directly or indirectly.”61 That de-
termination will, in turn, depend on a judicial finding that the reli-
gious beliefs of those who support the the law bear a strong “concep-
tual resemblance to the expressed secular rationale[s]” offered by the 
state to support it.62 
 
 57. Id. at 904. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 904–05. Advocates for deconstructing sexual ethics based on the Abrahamic 
religious traditions concede that alternative models of ethics are also based on religious beliefs. 
See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 47, at 214–15. 
  Instead, a form of egalitarian empowerment of both sexes through pansexual 
expression and interaction flowed from basic Native American beliefs about the na-
ture of the human body and of human sexuality in general. In contrast to Eu-
ro-American skittishness, native cultures did not view bodily or sexual activities as 
embarrassing or shameful either for men or for women: “Modesty and shame were 
not sentiments the Pueblo Indians knew in relationship to their bodies.” Instead, 
“[s]exuality was equated with fertility, regeneration, and the holy.” More specifically, 
“[s]exual intercourse was the symbol of cosmic harmony . . . because it united in bal-
ance all the masculine forces of the sky with all the feminine forces of the earth.” 
Therefore, “sexuality was deemed essential for the peaceful continuation of life.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 61. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 905.  
 62. Id. at 904; see Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as 
Legal Precedent, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 877 (1988); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frame-
works: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559 (1987) [hereinafer Walker & Mo-
 
  
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 27 
416 
The belief that the “sanctity of marriage” would be undermined by 
the inclusion of gay and lesbian couples bears a striking conceptual 
resemblance to the expressed secular rationale for maintaining the 
tradition of marriage as a union between dual-gender couples, but 
better identifies the source of the opposition. Whether expressly or  
impliedly, much of society rejects same-sex marriage due to sincere, deeply 
ingrained—even fundamental—religious belief.63 
The Varnum court thus concludes that the Iowa Constitution’s Es-
tablishment Clause64 requires judicial intervention in heated policy 
disputes whenever the complaining party can successfully character-
ize the debate as a “theological debate of religious clerics.”65 
 This contrast of opinions in our society largely explains the ab-
sence of any religion-based rationale to test the constitutionality of 
Iowa’s same-sex-marriage ban. Our constitution does not permit 
any branch of government to resolve these types of religious de-
bates and entrusts to courts the task of ensuring government avoids 
them. The statute at issue in this case does not prescribe a defini-
tion of marriage for religious institutions. Instead, the statute de-
clares, “Marriage is a civil contract” and then regulates that civil 
contract. Thus, in pursuing our task in this case, we proceed as civil 
judges, far removed from the theological debate of religious clerics, 
and focus only on the concept of civil marriage and the state licens-
ing system that identifies a limited class of persons entitled to secu-
lar rights and benefits associated with civil marriage.66 
This not a new argument. Those who oppose religious activism 
in politics have argued for years that courts are capable of distin-
guishing “secular” from “religious” arguments.67 They have also ar-
 
nahan, Social Frameworks]; John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Eval-
uating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (1986). Although it is not 
clear if judicial reliance on findings of “social fact” is legitimate in constitutional decision-
making, it is quite clear, as Professors Walker and Monahan put it, that there is a “more generic 
movement on the part of American courts to use general research findings to create a context or 
background within which facts specific to a case can be determined.” Walker & Monahan, So-
cial Frameworks, supra, at 571 n.32. The use of “social fact” as background played an important 
role in shaping the Supreme Court’s approach, if not the outcome of the case itself. It is in the 
social-framework sense that the term “social fact” is used here. 
 63. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 904 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 64. Iowa Const. art. I, §3. 
 65. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 905. 
 66. Id. (citations omitted). 
 67. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Calif. L. 
Rev. 753, 813–14 (1984) (discussing Professor Laurence Tribe’s proposal “that everything ‘ar-
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gued that sensitive ethical issues can be avoided, and that judges can 
preserve their neutrality on disputed political and moral issues, if 
courts focus only on process questions.68  
Had the Iowa Supreme Court limited its discussion in Varnum to 
the freedom shared by all citizens to make a civil contract,69 there 
would have been no occasion to discuss the “religious undercurrent 
propelling the same-sex marriage debate.”70 That discussion became 
necessary, in the court’s view, because marriage is far more than a 
civil contract. It is the means by which the political community “rec-
ognize[s] the status of the parties’ committed relationship.”71 
And thus, the constitutional issue is joined: Unless the political 
community and individual citizens are willing to take active steps to 
affirm the status of alternative “committeed relationships,” the courts 
will use equal-protection principles to compel them to do so. This is 
also the goal in Perry and Windsor. A Supreme Court holding that the 
United States Constitution requires that the states and the federal 
government must affirm that same-sex unions are “marriages” cannot 
be “the end” of the effort. Rather, as Winston Churchill observed af-
ter the Battle of El-Alamein: “It is not even the beginning of the end. 
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning . . .”72 of a much more ac-
tive and long-term effort to use federal and state laws, courts, the ed-
ucational system, and major cultural institutions to demonize and 
then to eliminate traditional concepts of gender, patriarchy, and heter-
 
guably religious’ should count as religious for free exercise purposes, and everything ‘arguably 
nonreligious’ should count as nonreligious for establishment purposes (citing Laurence Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law 812–87 (1st ed. 1978))); Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and 
Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 817, 835 (1984) (“Professor 
Tribe’s approach has the objectionable effect of permitting those groups and persons whose 
beliefs are both arguably religious and arguably not religious to . . . . have it both ways, which 
happens to be the classic definition of unfair preference. Members of traditional, ‘indisputably 
religious’ churches could hardly be expected to see the dual definition as anything but legalistic 
flim-flam in the service of nontheistic religious ideology.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 332–33 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]bortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral arguments surrounding the 
abortion controversy, are simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy.” 
(quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 449 (1977))). 
 69. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 905 (“The statute declares, ‘Marriage is a civil contract’ and 
then regulates that civil contract.”). 
 70. Id. at 904.  
 71. Id. at 883 (citing Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1984)). 
 72. Random House Webster’s Quotationary 58 (Leonard Roy Frank ed., 1999) 
(quoting Winston Churchill, Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Day luncheon, Mansion House, 
London (Nov. 10, 1942)). 
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onormativity from the law, and thus “to call attention to the legal (and 
social) fiction of ‘homosexuality.’”73 
The constitutional debate over same-sex marriage is, therefore, a 
debate over three related but distinct concepts: (1) the extent to 
which the Constitution permits the People to make and convey 
communal value judgments about which sexual relationships will be 
acknowledged, tolerated, or discouraged; (2) the extent to which in-
dividuals and associations are free to act in a manner that is incon-
sistent with those value judgments; and (3) the meaning of equal citi-
zenship and political participation. 
A. Religion on Trial 
The litigation over both California’s Proposition 8 and the feder-
al Defense of Marriage Act demonstrates that the courts have, by and 
large, accepted the contention of Dr. Gary Segura, one of the wit-
nesses at the Proposition 8 trial, that “religion [is] the chief obstacle 
to gay and lesbian political advances.”74 
[R]eligion is the chief obstacle for gay and lesbian political progress, 
and it’s the chief obstacle for a couple of reasons. . . . [I]t’s difficult 
to think of a more powerful social entity in American society than 
the church. . . . [I]t’s a very powerful organization, and in large 
measure they are arrayed against the interests of gays and lesbi-
ans. . . . [B]iblical condemnation of homosexuality and the teaching 
that gays are morally inferior on a regular basis to a huge percent-
age of the public makes the . . . political opportunity structure very 
hostile to gay interests. It’s very difficult to overcome that.75 
The trial court’s opinion contains page after page of evidence 
concerning the religious views of the proponents of Proposition 8, all 
 
 73. Laurie Rose Kepros, Queer Theory: Weed or Seed in the Garden of Legal Theory?, 9 Law 
& Sexuality: Rev. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Legal Issues 279, 297 (1999) 
(citing Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of 
“Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 
364 (1995) (“[ I]n order to dismantle the Euro-centric hetero-patriarchal status quo and to attain 
the ultimate goal of sex/gender equality, Queer legal theory must pursue a strategy that relent-
lessly combats the conflation [of sex, gender, and sexual orientation] and its sex/gender ideolo-
gy.”)). 
 74. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. 
Ct. 786 (2012). 
 75. Id. at 985 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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leading up to the conclusion that refusal to affirm the equal status 
and legitimacy of same-sex relationships is “irrational,” and can be 
compelled. 
 In the absence of a rational basis, what remains of proponents’ 
case is an inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, that 
Proposition 8 was premised on the belief that same-sex couples 
simply are not as good as opposite-sex couples. Whether that belief 
is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards 
gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a relationship between a 
man and a woman is inherently better than a relationship between 
two men or two women, this belief is not a proper basis on which to 
legislate. 
 . . . .  
 Moral disapproval alone is an improper basis on which to deny 
rights to gay men and lesbians. The evidence shows conclusively 
that Proposition 8 enacts, without reason, a private moral view that 
same-sex couples are inferior to opposite-sex couples.76 
The Second Circuit’s conclusion in Windsor v. United States77 is 
to the same effect: Congress is compelled by equal-protection princi-
ples to affirm same-sex relationships because “tradition is hard to jus-
tify as meeting the more demanding test of having a substantial rela-
tion to an important government interest.”78 
B. The Importance of the Analogy to Race 
The analogy to race79 has played a pivotal, and highly symbolic, 
role in the debate over legal recognition of same-sex unions. As 
 
 76. Id. at 1002–03 (citations omitted). 
 77. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
 78. Id. at 187. 
 79. Professor Valdes’s discussion of the miscegination analogy is one of the most suc-
cinct explanations I have found in the literature. In his view, “[d]iscrimination thought to be 
based on sexual orientation actually is based on sex because sexual orientation typically is de-
duced from the sex of the Plaintiffs and of their sexual partners.”Valdes, supra note 47, at 200 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
  Under this reformulation, the logic of the analogy unfolds in three steps. First, 
the miscegenation analogy shows that sex serves as the touchstone of sexual orienta-
tion. Second, the analogy reasons that this interaction between sex and sexual orien-
tation demonstrates that discrimination against humans with any particular sexuality 
must be recognized as based on sex. Finally, the analogy argues that this type of discrimi-
nation is akin to the invidious discrimination underlying miscegenation laws, and that such 
discrimination therefore is unlawful for the same reasons and despite the same asserted de-
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framed today, the analogy to race is the single, most powerful rhetor-
ical argument in favoring legal recognition of same-sex relationships; 
for it explicitly appropriates the moral force of the civil-rights move-
ment, as exemplified by the leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., the courage of Rosa Parks, and the quiet courage and persever-
ance of millions of African Americans (and their supporters) in the 
face of generations of slavery, legally enforced racial segregation, po-
litical exclusion, and ongoing debates over the most efficient ways to 
eliminate that legacy. 
For present purposes, this Article focuses on two aspects of the 
analogy to race that have received inadequate attention to date: (1) 
the political-equality aspects and (2) the natural-rights components of 
the analogy. Isolating these components will facilitate closer exami-
nation of the reasons why advocates and opponents of legal recogni-
tion of same-sex relationships draw such radically different conclu-
sions from the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the structure 
of federalism. It also helps to highlight the high-stakes, constitutional 
realpolitik so clearly in evidence in the Hawaii Supreme Court’s 
claim that “constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that cus-
toms change with an evolving social order.”80 
1. Dred Scott, natural rights, and the politics of political equality 
A close examination of the analogy to race begins with the Su-
preme Court’s infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.81  
The constitutional question presented to the Court in Dred Scott 
was deceptively simple. The Court was not writing on a clean slate. 
Mr. Scott had argued (correctly under Missouri law at the time): 
“The most general and appropriate definition of the term citizen is ‘a 
freeman.’ Being a freeman, and having his domicil in a State different 
 
fenses. The miscegenation analogy thus relies on a trio of traits: race, sex, and sexual 
orientation to make its point. Using race (and racism) to frame this analysis, the 
analogy thus urges termination of the legality attributed to “sexual orientation” dis-
crimination due to its linkage—or conflation—with discrimination based on sex. 
Valdes, supra note 47, at 200–01 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 80. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993). 
 81. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Professor David Currie has 
written that Dred Scott “was at least very possibly the first application of substantive due process 
in the Supreme Court, and in a sense, the original precedent for Lochner v. New York and Roe v. 
Wade.” David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Article IV and Federal Powers, 
1836-1864, 1983 Duke L.J. 695, 736 & nn. 262–64 (footnotes omitted). 
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from that of the defendant, he is a citizen within the act of Congress, 
and the courts of the Union are open to him”82 to file a petition for a 
redress of his grievances against Mr. Sandford.83 
The Court, however, was not prepared to accept the social impli-
cations of that otherwise-unremarkable jurisdictional holding, be-
cause it would have implicitly acknowledged that persons of African 
descent enjoy the same natural right of political equality as other 
Americans: i.e, “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property.”84 Rather than rely 
 
 82. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 531 (McLean, J., dissenting); see U.S. Const. art. 
III, § 2. 
 83. Mr. Scott’s goal was to sue for his freedom. Under the relevant law at the time, this 
question was not presented directly, but rather through an action for breach of an implied con-
tract (assumpsit) for the value of the services rendered by the person seeking his or her freedom. 
If the person was held to be “in service,” there was no obligation for the master to pay, but if 
the person alleged to be a slave were actually a free person, the employer would be liable for the 
fair market value of the services rendered. Thus, Mr. Scott’s suit was for trespass vi et armis: i.e., 
for damages against his former owner for having forcibly held Mr. Scott and members of his 
family as slaves. 
In Jarrot v. Jarrot, 7 Ill. 1 (1845), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Con-
stitution permitted persons alleged to be slaves to sue for the value of compelled labor. Dred 
Scott was held “in service” in Illinois. Federal law, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, did not 
recognize the institution of slavery, and the Missouri Compromise prohibited it in the Minne-
sota Territory. 
Missouri was a slave state but did recognize the right of a person alleged to be a slave to 
sue in assumpsit for the value of his services. With respect to the specific issue in that case, the 
court had held that Illinois law operates as a manumission of a slave who provides labor for the 
master in Illinois, and that the status of master/slave does not revive when the person so freed 
returns to a slave state. Asserting his right to sue in assumpsit, Dred Scott had sued in Missouri, 
but the Missouri court held that it would no longer give comity to Illinois law on this point. 
Times are not now as they were when the former decisions on this subject were 
made. Since then not only individuals but States have been possessed with a dark and 
fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pursuit of 
measures whose inevitable consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of 
our government. Under such circumstances, it does not behoove the State of Mis-
souri to show the least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. 
She is willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence of slavery within her 
limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others. 
Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 586 (1852). 
 84. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), provided, in relevant 
part: 
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, ex-
cluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; 
and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition 
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and 
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on the settled law of Missouri and the text of the Constitution, the 
Court answered the question by reference to “the state of public 
opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the 
civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the 
Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the 
United States was framed and adopted”85 and by reference to “the 
public history of every European nation.”86 In the Court’s view, per-
sons of African descent could have no political rights, even if they had 
been emancipated,87 because they had no natural rights. 
 They had for more than a century before [the ratification of the 
Constitution] been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and al-
together unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or 
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which 
the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly 
and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.88 
Viewed in the legal context from which they arose, Sections One 
and Five of the Fourteenth Amendment were legislative responses to 
the well-founded fear of the Reconstruction Congress that a hostile89 
 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like pun-
ishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 85. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407 (majority opinion). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Writing in Bryann v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198 (1853), Justice John Henry Lumpkin 
of the Georgia Supreme Court wrote: 
  Whereas, we maintain, that the status of the African in Georgia, whether bond 
or free, is such that he has no civil, social or political rights or capacity, whatever, ex-
cept such as are bestowed on him by Statute; that he can neither contract, nor be 
contracted with; that the free negro can act only by and through his guardian; that he 
is in a state of perpetual pupilage or wardship; and that this condition he can never 
change by his own volition. It can only be done by Legislation. 
  That the act of manumission confers no other right but that of freedom from 
the dominion of the master, and the limited liberty of locomotion; that it does not 
and cannot confer citizenship, nor any of the powers, civil or political, incident to citi-
zenship; that the social and civil degradation, resulting from the taint of blood, ad-
heres to the descendants of Ham in this country, like the poisoned tunic of Nessus; 
that nothing but an Act of the Assembly can purify, by the salt of its grace, the bitter 
fountain—the “darkling sea.” 
 88. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407. 
 89. The Court’s hostility, both to the cause of civil rights and to the power of Congress 
and the States to create enforcement remedies that would eliminate the vestiges of race-based 
slavery, is underscored by the opinions in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23–29 (1883) (parts 
of majority opinion; parts of dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.). 
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Supreme Court would strike down the Civil Rights Act of 186690and 
thereby make it impossible for Congress and the States to ensure the 
political equality of their citizens. The Court had taken that power 
away from them in Dred Scott.91 The Citizenship and Privileges and 
Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly re-
claimed it, and gave it back to the federal government and to the 
states, respectively. 
But the Court does not readily cede power. Subsequent amend-
ments92 have been necessary to remind the Court that conceptions of 
rights firmly rooted in the nature of the human person are the only 
enduring basis for the political-equality principles woven like threads 
into the very fabric of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the Court has 
only rarely been willing to accept natural-rights arguments as either 
valid or probative93—and it has never accepted them in the context of 
 
 90. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 91. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Court interpreted Article IV in a manner that negated 
the federalism it embodies. By reading the scope of congressional power over the territories 
narrowly, the Court gutted both the Missouri Compromise and the power of Congress under 
Article IV, § 3 to adopt “all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.” By permitting the Missouri Supreme Court to refuse 
to give effect to the law of Illinois governing the personal status and contractual capacity of 
those who resided in Illinois or entered into contractual relationships to be performed there, 
Jarrot v. Jarrot, 7 Ill. 1 (1845), the Court negated the cooperative federalism implicit in the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 555–58 
(McLean, J., dissenting). The gutting of Article IV made it impossible for either Congress or 
the free states to protect the privileges and immunities of individuals living within their respec-
tive jurisdictions. 
 92. The text of the Fifteenth Amendment underscored the central message that the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were intended to convey: That all persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States are citizens of the United States and of the states in which they reside, and 
are entitled to all privileges and immunities of state and federal citizenship without regard to their race. 
Later amendments extended the guarantee of political equality to women, U.S. Const. amend. 
XIX (1920), to citizens of the District of Columbia, U.S. Const. amend. XXIII (1961), to citi-
zens who cannot afford to pay poll taxes, U.S. Const. amend. XXIV (1964), and to persons 
who have attained the age of 18, U.S. Const. amend. XXVI (1971). 
 93. The struggle within the Court of the natural-rights aspects of sex-based training 
programs was very much on display in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Because 
the State of Virginia and VMI did not appear even to have tried to create and tailor an “adver-
sative” system designed to equip women for leadership roles in the military, the Justices never 
had an occasion to address the legitimacy of single-sex educational programs that build upon 
actual differences between men and women that are demonstrably relevant to success in a mili-
tary environment. The debate has been impoverished as a result. Compare, e.g., Dawinder S. 
Sidhu, Are Blue and Pink the New Brown? The Permissibility of Sex-Segregated Education as Affirm-
ative Action, 17 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 579, 596 (2008) (arguing an affirmative-action ra-
tionale as the “exceedingly persuasive justification” for sex-based educational programs), with 
Peggy DesAutels, Sex Differences and Neuroethics, 23 Phil. Psychol. 95, 95 (2010) (“ For if, as 
some neuroscientists claim, there are significant differences in the brains of men versus women 
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race.94 For reasons that will be explored in greater detail below, the 
Court prefers a substantive due-process approach that subordinates 
the natural rights of individuals to its institutional understanding of 
the demands of the culture.95 
2. Political equality and natural rights: Perez v. Lippold and the attack on 
Dred Scott and Plessy 
It is ironic that the LGBT community and other supporters of 
same-sex marriage have put traditional religious beliefs about sexual 
ethics and behavior on trial in the dispute over legal recognition of 
same-sex and alternative-sexual relationships. It is doubly ironic that 
the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church about the nature of 
human sexuality have been singled out for an explicit, public con-
demnation by the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of 
San Francisco.96 For those very teachings are the philosophical foun-
 
and in the brains of boys versus girls, the ethical and social implications loom very large in-
deed.”). 
 94. The closest the Court has come to repudiating the use of race in government pro-
grams is Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007). Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion took aim at Justice Breyer’s view. 
Disfavoring a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution, the dissent would give 
school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of race—an approach remi-
niscent of that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v. Board of Education. This 
approach is just as wrong today as it was a half century ago. The Constitution and 
our cases require us to be much more demanding before permitting local school 
boards to make decisions based on race. 
Id. at 748 (Thomas, J. concurring) (citation omitted). 
 95. Post–New Deal discussions of the allocation of political jurisdiction assume that the 
Constitution assigns primary responsibility for defining and protecting our rights as individuals 
to the “Judicial Department” of the federal government. Two related subsidiary propositions 
flow from this assumption. One is that the obligation of the judicial department to render 
judgment in cases of alleged abuse or usurpation of power is (or should be) inversely propor-
tional to the political power the litigant can command in the public arena. See, e.g., John Hart 
Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 9, 16 (1978) (arguing 
that the role of courts should be limited to protection of the politically powerless). The other is 
that the allocation of power between the federal government and the states is qualitatively dif-
ferent for constitutional purposes than, for example, the relationship between the legislative and 
judicial branches. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 
(1982) (holding broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts was unconstitutional). For a 
more extensive discussion of these topics—and their application in a human-rights context—see 
Robert A. Destro, Federalism, Human Rights, and the Realpolitik of Footnote Four, 12 Widener 
L.J. 373 (2003). 
 96. Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 464 F. Supp. 
2d 938, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d en banc, 624 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Board of 
Supervisors, City and County of San Francisco, Resolution No. 168-06 (March 21, 2006)). 
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dation of the analogy to race from which the argument for same-sex 
marriage draws its emotive force, and on which they have staked their 
claims in the same-sex-marriage cases. 
Professor Fay Botham97 provides an in-depth account of a fasci-
nating, but largely unknown, story about the positive influence that 
Catholic moral principles have had on this nation’s understanding of 
both race relations and the nature of marriage. Most of the material 
that appears in this section is drawn from her book. 
Religion appears in Perez v. Lippold—the California Supreme Court 
case in which Perez and Davis won the right to marry—in two criti-
cal but very different ways. First, Perez took place wholly within the 
multiracial Catholic context of California, and specifically, within a 
progressive interracial Catholic parish in Los Angeles. . . . Second, 
as the couple’s desire to marry became a legal matter, their Catholic 
attorney, Daniel Marshall, inserted Catholic belief directly into his 
legal arguments. He developed an explicitly religion-based legal 
 
Resolution urging Cardinal William Levada, in his capacity as head of the Congrega-
tion for the Doctrine of the Faith at the Vatican, to withdraw his discriminatory and 
defamatory directive that Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco 
stop placing children in need of adoption with homosexual households. 
  WHEREAS, It is an insult to all San Franciscans when a foreign country, like 
the Vatican, meddles with and attempts to negatively influence this great City’s exist-
ing and established customs and traditions such as the right of same-sex couples to 
adopt and care for children in need; and 
  WHEREAS, The statements of Cardinal Levada and the Vatican that “Catho-
lic agencies should not place children for adoption in homosexual households,” and 
“Allowing children to be adopted by persons living in such unions would actually 
mean doing violence to these children” are absolutely unacceptable to the citizenry 
of San Francisco; and  
  WHEREAS, Such hateful and discriminatory rhetoric is both insulting and cal-
lous, and shows a level of insensitivity and ignorance which has seldom been encoun-
tered by this Board of Supervisors; and 
  WHEREAS, Same-sex couples are just as qualified to be parents as are hetero-
sexual couples; and 
  WHEREAS, Cardinal Levada is a decidedly unqualified representative of his 
former home city, and of the people of San Francisco and the values they hold dear; 
and  
  WHEREAS, The Board of Supervisors urges Archbishop Niederauer and the 
Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco to defy all discriminatory di-
rectives of Cardinal Levada; now, therefore, be it  
  RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors urges Cardinal William Levada, 
in his capacity as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith [sic] at the Vat-
ican (formerly known as Holy Office of the Inquisition), to withdraw his discrimina-
tory and defamatory directive that Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San 
Francisco stop placing children in need of adoption with homosexual households. 
 97. Fay Botham, Almighty God Created the Races: Christianity, Interracial 
Marriage, and American Law (Kindle ed. 2009). 
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strategy that made religious freedom—and specifically, religious 
freedom for Catholics—the basis of his case. Analysis of religion in 
Perez thus underscores, on the one hand, Christianity and region, 
and on the other, Christianity and law. Both of these issues in turn 
underline the centrality of Catholic Christianity in Perez.98 
Perez v. Lippold99 is the case that marks the beginning of the end 
for anti-miscegination laws across the country. The California Su-
preme Court decided the case in 1948, a point in time when it was 
impossible to mount a frontal, federal attack on the eugenic racism 
embedded in California’s anti-miscegination law.100 Just as the Re-
construction Congress had feared, the U.S. Supreme Court had re-
fused to implement the political-equality principles embedded in Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court had also set 
back the cause of equal citizenship and human dignity for generations 
when it affirmed Jim Crow laws in Plessy v. Ferguson101 and the eu-
genic sterilization of persons with mental disabilities in Buck v. 
Bell.102 The Court’s less-than-fulsome repudiation of racial dispari-
ties in public education in Brown v. Board of Education103 would not 
enter the nation’s consciousness for another seven years. When Perez 
was decided, “separate, but equal” was the law of the land.104 
 
 98. Id. at locations 207–10. 
 99. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
 100. See Robert A. Destro, Introduction, Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Vir-
ginia After 30 Years, 47 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1207 (1998); Emily Field Van Tassel, “Only the Law 
Would Rule Between Us”: Antimiscegenation, the Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate over 
Rights After the Civil War, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 873, 916–27 (1995). 
 101. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544–45 (1896). 
 102. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 103. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954). 
 104. The Court’s words in Plessy bear repeating here: 
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of 
the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been in-
tended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished 
from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory 
to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where they 
are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either 
race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within 
the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. . . . 
  . . . . 
  We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the 
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the 
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. 
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544, 551. 
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Sylvester Davis, an African American man, and Andrea Perez, a 
Hispanic woman of Mexican descent, were members of St. Patrick’s 
Catholic Church in Los Angeles. When they became engaged in 
1947, they asked their pastor, Father Joseph Della Torre, about get-
ting married in the church. He told them that Los Angeles County 
would not issue them a license because the bride-to-be was a white 
woman and her fiancé was a black man. 
Ms. Perez had worked as a babysitter for a couple who were also 
members of St. Patrick’s—Daniel and Dorothy Marshall. She con-
tacted the Marshalls to see if they might be able to help. Daniel Mar-
shall, the President of the Catholic Interracial Council of Los Ange-
les, a group that met regularly at St. Patrick’s, readily agreed to take 
their case. 
Since Mr. Marshall knew that a frontal, legal attack on eugenic 
racism was impossible, he took a different approach—and, in doing 
so, changed history. In a spring 1947 letter to Los Angeles Auxiliary 
Bishop Joseph McGucken, Marshall explained that his case against 
the law would rest on religious liberty, not racial equality. After set-
ting out the basic principles of the Catholic theology of marriage, in 
which “[t]here is no rule, regulation[,] or law of the Roman Catholic 
Church which forbids a white person and a Negro person from re-
ceiving conjointly the sacrament of matrimony and thus to intermar-
ry,”105 the Petition for a Writ of Mandamus argued: 
 15. Said refusal of respondent to issue petitioners said license to 
intermarry results in and has the effect (a) of denying to them, and 
each of them, the right to participate fully in the sacramental life of 
the religion in which they believe, as aforesaid; (b) prohibits the free 
exercise by petitioners of their said religion; (c) violates the guaran-
ty to petitioners of the free exercise and enjoyment by them of their 
religious profession and worship; (d) violates each of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States; 
(e) violates Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of 1879, of the 
State of California; 
 
 105. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and 
Proof of Service at 3, Perez v. Moroney, No. LA 20305 (Cal. Aug. 8, 1947), 
http://db.tt/Ql9sWATo. 
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 16. Section 69 of the Civil Code of the State of California is ar-
bitrary, capricious and without reasonable relation to any purpose 
within the competency of the state to effect[.]106 
The strategy was brilliant. An attack on the eugenic racism of 
Dred Scott and Plessy that was embedded in Section 69 of the Civil 
Code107 was neatly wrapped inside an argument that the state had 
neither the right—nor any legitimate reason—to interfere with the 
sacramental life of the Church and its members. 
Pope Pius XI’s 1937 Encyclical, Mit Brennender Sorge, had ex-
pressly (and in German) condemned Third Reich’s eugenic theories 
of racial purity as a “myth of race and blood.”108 It pleaded with 
Germans to remember that the “real common good ultimately takes 
its measure from man’s nature,” and argued that any law or policy 
that ignores human nature will “shake the pillars on which society 
rests, and . . . compromise social tranquility, security and exist-
ence.”109 The 1910 Catholic Encyclopedia had made the same point 
with respect to marriage. 
 
 106. Id. at 4–5. 
 107. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 18 (Cal. 1948). 
  Civil Code section 69 implements Civil Code section 60, which provides: “All 
marriages of white persons with negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or 
mulattoes are illegal and void.” This section originally appeared in the Civil Code in 
1872, but at that time it prohibited marriages only between white persons and Ne-
groes or mulattoes. It succeeded a statute prohibiting such marriages and authorizing 
the imposition of certain criminal penalties upon persons contracting or solemnizing 
them. Since 1872, Civil Code section 60 has been twice amended, first to prohibit 
marriages between white persons and Mongolians and subsequently to prohibit mar-
riages between white persons and members of the Malay race. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 108. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Mit Brennender Sorge, at para. 17 (Mar. 14, 1937), 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_14031937_mit-
brennender-sorge_en.html (“The peak of the revelation as reached in the Gospel of Christ . . .  
knows no retouches by human hand; it admits no substitutes or arbitrary alternatives such as 
certain leaders pretend to draw from the so-called myth of race and blood. . . . Should any man 
dare, in sacrilegious disregard of the essential differences between God and His creature, be-
tween the God-man and the children of man, to place a mortal, were he the greatest of all 
times, by the side of, or over, or against, Christ, he would deserve to be called prophet of noth-
ingness, to whom the terrifying words of Scripture would be applicable: ‘He that dwelleth in 
heaven shall laugh at them.’” (citation omitted)). 
 109. Id. at para. 30 (“To overlook this truth is to forget that the real common good ulti-
mately takes its measure from man’s nature, which balances personal rights and social obliga-
tions, and from the purpose of society, established for the benefit of human nature. Society, was 
intended by the Creator for the full development of individual possibilities, and for the social 
benefits, which by a give and take process, everyone can claim for his own sake and that of oth-
ers. Higher and more general values, which collectivity alone can provide, also derive from the 
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 When men pretend to be the final arbiters of the marriage con-
tract, they base their claim on the assumption that this contract is 
merely of human institution and is subject to no laws above those of 
man. But human society, both in its primitive and organized form, 
originated by marriage, not marriage by human society. . . . Evolu-
tionists, indeed, account for marriage by the gregarious habits of 
human beings. They consider it a developed social instinct, a matter 
of utility, convenience, and decency, a consequence of sexual inter-
course, which human society decided to regulate by law, and thus 
encourage a state of affairs conducive to the peace and happiness of 
the race. They do not deny that the religious feeling latent in the 
human heart regarding marriage and the religious ceremonies at-
tendant on its celebration have their utility, but they insist that mar-
riage is entirely a natural thing.110 
All four justices in the Perez majority accepted Mr. Marshall’s ar-
gument. 
 [The racial characteristics contained in] Section 69 of the Civil 
Code and section 60 on which it is based are . . . too vague and un-
certain to be upheld as a valid regulation of the right to marry. En-
forcement of the statute would place upon the officials charged with 
its administration and upon the courts charged with reviewing the 
legality of such administration the task of determining the meaning 
of the statute. That task could be carried out with respect to persons 
of mixed ancestry only on the basis of conceptions of race classifica-
tion not supplied by the Legislature. “If no judical certainty can be 
settled upon as to the meaning of a statute, the courts are not at lib-
erty to supply one.” 
 In summary, we hold that sections 60 and 69 are not only too 
vague and uncertain to be enforceable regulations of a fundamental 
right, but that they violate the equal protection of the laws clause of 
the United States Constitution by impairing the right of individuals 
to marry on the basis of race alone and by arbitrarily and unreason-
ably discriminating against certain racial groups.111 
Perez is notable for two reasons. First, by resting its decision on 
the U.S. Constitution, the California Supreme Court challenged the 
 
Creator for the good of man, and for the full development, natural and supernatural, and the 
realization of his perfection. To neglect this order is to shake the pillars on which society rests, 
and to compromise social tranquility, security and existence.”). 
 110. Catholic Encyclopedia, Moral and Canonical Aspect of Marriage, Catholic Online, 
http://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=7602 (last visited May 26, 2013). 
 111. Perez, 198 P.2d at 29 (citation omitted). 
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authority of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the State of California 
wisely gave the High Court no opportunity to review the decision. 
Though Chief Justice Traynor’s majority opinion was discretely re-
spectful of the U.S. Supreme Court’s authority, it took great pains to 
point out that its finding of a constitutional “right to marry” was 
based on federal, not state, substantive due-process principles.112 
Second, the concurring opinions of Justices Carter and Edmonds 
were not so respectful. They attacked the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holdings in Dred Scott and Plessy on explicitly religious grounds. Rely-
ing on The Declaration of Independence, the United Nations Char-
ter, Abraham Lincoln, Cedric Dover, Thomas Jefferson, and the 
Apostle Paul, Justice Carter delivered a broadside against the Court’s 
record from Dred Scott forward. 
In the years following the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments, many courts still did not think that 
there was real equality among men despite the fact that the lan-
guage of the amendments is quite clear. Another round of the vi-
cious circle was begun, this time by limiting as far as possible the 
language of the amendments. Many cases might be cited to support 
this view, but the hardest blow to liberal minded persons—the big-
gest step backwards into days of slavery—was the decision in Plessy 
v. Ferguson.113 
Justice Edmonds, who cast the all-important, fourth (and decid-
ing) vote in Perez, went even further in his reliance on the religious 
arguments, which Daniel Marshall had presented. 
 
 112. The Perez court quoted Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), for the proposition 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
[w]ithout doubt, . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of 
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and, generally, to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men. 
Perez, 198 P.2d at 18–19 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).  
The Perez court relied on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925), for the 
proposition that “No law within the broad areas of state interest may be unreasonably discrimi-
natory or arbitrary.” Perez, 198 P.2d at 19. The court also quoted Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 541 (1942): “We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil 
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of 
the race.” Perez, 198 P.2d at 19. 
 113. Perez, 198 P.2d at 31 (Carter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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 I agree with the conclusion that marriage is “something more 
than a civil contract subject to regulation by the State; it is a funda-
mental right of free men.” Moreover, it is grounded in the funda-
mental principles of Christianity. The right to marry, therefore, is 
protected by the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, and 
I place my concurrence in the judgment upon a broader ground 
than that the challenged statutes are discriminatory and irration-
al.114 
3. The Supreme Court of the United States on race—from Dred Scott to 
Plessy, Brown, and Loving 
Examination of the Supreme Court’s opinions on both race and 
marriage confirms that the ghost of Plessy haunts its jurisprudence on 
both race and marriage to this day. Students are often surprised to 
learn that the phrase “Plessy is overruled” does not appear in any of 
the Supreme Court’s opinions. Though the Court has asserted that it 
“repudiated” and “overruled”115 Plessy in Brown, its words—and 
hence its decision in Loving v. Virginia—bespeak an approach de-
signed to maintain and extend its asserted power to serve as the 
branch of government that reflects the mores and political sensibili-
ties of “the thoughtful part of the Nation,”116 rather than its assigned 
role under Article III. That role is to serve as the ultimate guarantor 
 
 114. Id. at 34 (Edmonds, J., concurring). 
 115. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862–63 (1992) (“[T]his 
understanding of the facts [in Plessy] and the rule it was stated to justify were repudiated in 
Brown v. Board of Education.” (citation omitted)); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 767 (1974) 
(“[W]e would be opening a way to nullify Brown v. Board of Education which overruled 
Plessy . . . .” (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973), rev’d, 418 U.S. 717 
(1974))); Gomperts v. Chase, 404 U.S. 1237, 1240 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971) (noting that 
“Plessy v. Ferguson has not yet been overruled on its mandate that separate facilities be equal”). 
 116. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at 864. Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter explained: 
  West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, 
changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier consti-
tutional resolutions. Each case was comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts 
that the country could understand, or had come to understand already, but which the 
Court of an earlier day, as its own declarations disclosed, had not been able to per-
ceive. As the decisions were thus comprehensible they were also defensible, not merely as the 
victories of one doctrinal school over another by dint of numbers (victories though 
they were), but as applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not 
been seen by the Court before. In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed 
circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept 
each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s constitutional duty. 
Id. at 863–64 (emphasis added) 
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of individual political equality under a written constitution and laws 
that expressly forbid the use of race as a legal construct abridging the 
rights of citizens.117 
Unlike the California Supreme Court in Perez, the U.S. Supreme 
Court was not compelled to follow federal precedent. In Loving, the 
Court faced a stark choice: The first option was to invalidate Virgin-
ia’s anti-miscegenation law as a forbidden racial classification that vi-
olated both the Constitution and the guarantee of the right to make 
and enforce contracts embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That 
approach, however, would actually have overruled Plessy, which also 
(and not incidentally) involved the right to make a contract. The sec-
ond option was to use a due-process rationale that would preserve the 
power it claimed in Plessy to strike balances between the rights of 
equal citizenship and the opinions of “the thoughtful part of the Na-
tion.” The Court chose the latter.118 In doing so, the Court extended 
its claim of judicial supremacy into the field of family law.119 
 
 117. U.S. Const. amend. XV, §1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”). Even as these words are written, the Court has yet to repudi-
ate its claim that the power of judicial review confers on the Court alone the power to approve—
or disapprove—the use of race as an organizing principle for government action. See Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 118. Though all the Justices agreed that Virginia’s statute was unconstitutional, they disa-
greed on two key points: (1) which constitutional norms were applicable under the circum-
stances; and (2) the appropriate formulation of the rule(s) of decision. Justice Stewart’s concur-
ring opinion in Loving is both short and to the point. Since the words of the statute “ma[de] the 
criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor,” Justice Stewart classified the cause of 
action as a race-based equal-protection claim. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stew-
art, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
We will never know precisely why the Court chose to address a “right to marry” in Lov-
ing, but the answer appears to reside the ongoing debate within the Court concerning the ap-
propriate standard of review in race-discrimination cases. The majority in Loving was unwilling 
to hold that the Equal Protection Clause operates as a categorical negative on race-based laws. 
Following the approach it adopted in Plessy, and later reaffirmed in both Brown I and Brown II, 
the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren held that Virginia had failed to sustain its “very 
heavy burden of justification,” Id. at 9 (majority opinion), because there was “patently no legit-
imate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this 
classification.” Id. at 11. 
Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Loving took a dim view of the Court’s “balanc-
ing” approach. Adopting the rationale of his concurring opinion in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184, 198 (1964), Justice Stewart castigated the majority for attempting to maintain flexibil-
ity on the permissibility of race discrimination when, in his view, the Constitution prescribes a 
categorical rule. 
  I concur in the judgment and agree with most of what is said in the Court’s 
opinion. But the Court implies that a criminal law of the kind here involved might be 
constitutionally valid if a State could show “some overriding statutory purpose.” This 
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IV. Does the Constitution Require Communal or 
Individual Affirmation of Same-Sex Relationships? 
When the San Francisco Board of Supervisors condemned the 
Catholic Church for its view that it is best for children if they are 
raised in stable, heterosexual households,120 it described that position 
as “hateful and discriminatory rhetoric” that “is both insulting and 
callous, and shows a level of insensitivity and ignorance which has 
seldom been encountered by this Board of Supervisors.” It further 
opined, among other things, that “[s]ame-sex couples are just as qual-
ified to be parents as are heterosexual couples.”121 
 
is an implication in which I cannot join, because I cannot conceive of a valid legisla-
tive purpose under our Constitution for a state law which makes the color of a per-
son’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense. . . . And I think it is 
simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes 
the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor. Discrimination of that 
kind is invidious per se. 
Id. 
 119. See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859). See generally Anthony B. 
Ullman, Comment, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 
1824 (1983). 
 120. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give 
Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons, at para. 5, Holy See, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030
731_homosexual-unions_en.html (last accessed May 26, 2013). 
  Where the government’s policy is de facto tolerance and there is no explicit legal 
recognition of homosexual unions, it is necessary to distinguish carefully the various 
aspects of the problem. Moral conscience requires that, in every occasion, Christians 
give witness to the whole moral truth, which is contradicted both by approval of ho-
mosexual acts and unjust discrimination against homosexual persons. Therefore, dis-
creet and prudent actions can be effective; these might involve: unmasking the way in 
which such tolerance might be exploited or used in the service of ideology; stating 
clearly the immoral nature of these unions; reminding the government of the need to 
contain the phenomenon within certain limits so as to safeguard public morality and, 
above all, to avoid exposing young people to erroneous ideas about sexuality and 
marriage that would deprive them of their necessary defences and contribute to the 
spread of the phenomenon. Those who would move from tolerance to the legitimi-
zation of specific rights for cohabiting homosexual persons need to be reminded that 
the approval or legalization of evil is something far different from the toleration of 
evil. 
  In those situations where homosexual unions have been legally recognized or 
have been given the legal status and rights belonging to marriage, clear and emphatic 
opposition is a duty. One must refrain from any kind of formal cooperation in the 
enactment or application of such gravely unjust laws and, as far as possible, from ma-
terial cooperation on the level of their application. In this area, everyone can exercise 
the right to conscientious objection. 
 121. Board of Supervisors, City and County of San Francisco, Resolution No. 168-06, 
supra, note 96. 
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This Article is neither the time nor the place to engage this de-
bate. It will suffice, for present purposes, to note that there is profound 
disagreement here. It is simply not possible to validate a charge that 
the Catholic Church’s official position on a question so fraught with 
difficulty as the optimal environment for raising children is “hateful,” 
“insulting and callous,” and “insensitive.” Nor is it possible to quanti-
fy (assuming that anyone even made the effort to measure) the rela-
tive “level[s] of insensitivity and ignorance . . . encountered by [that 
particular] Board of Supervisors” in the day-to-day exercise of its of-
ficial and non-official duties. What is interesting about this exchange 
is the charge by elected officials of the City and County of San Fran-
cisco that the Church’s long-standing position on the relative merits 
of raising children in stable, heterosexual households is “ignorant.” 
If we assume, as we must, that the Board of Supervisors believes 
that opposition to same-sex marriage and same-sex parenting is both 
“ignorant” and “hateful,” we are still left with a constitutional conun-
drum. Does the Constitution require any person or association to af-
firm a disputed point of religious morality, social theory, or political 
ideology? 
The answer is “No.” 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any 
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to 
us.122 
We need not belabor the point, which is well-documented in the 
literature, that Supreme Court precedent is both clear and consistent: 
Governments may not compel any individual or group to affirm a 
message they disagree with.123 There is also no disagreement about 
the desire of same-sex-marriage supporters to force political commu-
 
 122. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 123. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 
(1995); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 
U.S. 781 (1988); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1986) 
(plurality opinion); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1976) (per curiam); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 
(1974) (striking Florida’s right-to-reply statute because “[t]he Florida statute operates as a 
command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified 
matter”). 
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nities to affirm the equal status and legitimacy of their relationships. 
The California Supreme Court’s opinion in the Marriage Cases makes 
this point explicitly. 
[F]or a number of reasons we conclude that in the present context, 
affording same-sex couples access only to the separate institution of 
domestic partnership, and denying such couples access to the estab-
lished institution of marriage, properly must be viewed as imping-
ing upon the right of those couples to have their family relationship ac-
corded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the family relationship of 
opposite-sex couples. 
 First, because of the long and celebrated history of the term 
“marriage” and the widespread understanding that this term de-
scribes a union unreservedly approved and favored by the commu-
nity, there clearly is a considerable and undeniable symbolic im-
portance to this designation. . . .  
 Second, . . . retaining a distinction in nomenclature . . . inevita-
bly will cause the new parallel institution that has been made availa-
ble to those couples to be viewed as of a lesser stature than marriage 
and, in effect, as a mark of second-class citizenship. . . .  
 Third, it also is significant that although the meaning of the 
term “marriage” is well understood by the public generally, the sta-
tus of domestic partnership is not.124 
The only question here is whether the Equal Protection Clause 
effectively “repeals” the First Amendment to the extent that a politi-
cal or private community can be accused of harboring “hateful,” dis-
criminatory, or homophobic tendencies.  
The answer to this question is also “No.” 
The Constitution respects the political equality of both persons 
and political communities. The only “permanent” provision of the 
United States Constitution is the political equality of the states em-
bodied in their equal representation in the Senate.125 As communities, 
the states have an equal right to self-rule protected by the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, and a guarantee that Congress will intervene if 
the political community deviates for any reason from “a Republican 
form of Government.”126 The Establishment Clause is also a guaran-
 
 124. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 445–46 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 125. U.S. Const. art. V (“[A]nd that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of 
its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
 126. U.S. Const. art. IV (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
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tee that religious associations are entitled to equal treatment at the 
hands of the federal government. In sum, the Constitution is built 
around a series of structural mechanisms that protect the political 
equality of American citizens, both individually and collectively. 
Textual support for the principle of political equality among citi-
zens is found in the following places: 
 The Qualifications Clauses of Articles I and II for Members of 
Congress and the President. 
 The Qualifications Clause for Electors in Article I—which was 
modified by the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, 
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments 
 The No Religious Test Clause of Article VI 
 The Interstate Privileges & Immunities Clause of Article VI. 
 The entire Bill of Rights—particularly the First Amendment, 
but not ignoring the substantial political-equality compo-
nents of the Third Amendment and the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment 
 The Reconstruction Amendments (Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments) 
 The Voting Rights Amendments (Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, 
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments) 
While much has been said and written about the Court’s some-
what truncated view of political equality—and of the demands it im-
poses on Congress—in the “Reverse Incorporation Doctrine,” here, 
we must focus on the meaning of political equality itself. How does it 
factor into the constitutional law that governs the questions posed in 
this symposium? Does the United States Constitution require legal recog-
nition of same-sex marriages? 
V. Does the Analogy to Race Support Compelled 
Affirmation of Same-Sex Unions? 
It finally comes down to this. Does the Constitution require 
recognition of same-sex marriage because discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation is the functional and moral equivalent of race 
discrimation? 
 
a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
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The answer to this question is an emphatic “No.” 
Let us return for a moment to the City and County of San Fran-
cisco’s broadside against the Roman Catholic Church. Even if we as-
sume that the Church’s stated preference for placing children in sta-
ble, heterosexual households is “discriminatory” (and the Church 
concedes as much),127 we cannot answer the question whether the 
distinction drawn is unjust without first considering the reasons for 
the distinction. 
If, as both Congress and the majority of the states have conclud-
ed, there is a public consensus against affirmation of same-sex unions, 
it is perfectly rational for legislators and voters to refuse to grant that 
affirmation. The analogy to race adds nothing to the equation be-
cause the concept of race has no natural-rights components. It is, and al-
ways has been, a purely political construct.128 
And thus we return to the problem of compelled affirmation. The 
only way that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation can be 
the (im)moral equivalent of discrimination on the basis of race is if 
the concept of “sexual orientation” is, like race, a purely political con-
struct. 
But not even the most ardent advocates of “Queer Theory”  
accept that. 
 
 127. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Some Considerations Concerning the Re-
sponse to Legislative Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons, at para. 11, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19920
724_homosexual-persons_en.html (last visited May 26, 2013) (“There are areas in which it is 
not unjust discrimination to take sexual orientation into account, for example, in the placement 
of children for adoption or foster care . . . .”). 
 128. See, e.g., Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 27 (Cal. 1948). Before the voyages of Co-
lumbus, the concept of race was used to distinguish among Christians, Jews, and Pagans (i.e. the 
“Christian race” or the “Pagan races”). The race-as-color concept developed in the early 1500s 
when British and Dutch slave traders, condemned on religious grounds by the Vatican, devel-
oped a post hoc Biblical defense for their actions. One justification was that “‘the Negro was a 
heathen and a barbarian, an outcast among the peoples of the earth, a descendant of Noah’s son 
Ham, cursed by God himself and doomed to be a servant forever” because of the sin of looking 
upon his father’s nakedness. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Signifi-
cance in American Law and Politics 12 (1978) (internal quotation mark omitted); accord D. 
Marvin Jones, “We’re All Stuck Here for a While”: Law and the Social Construction of the Black 
Male, 24 J. Contemp. L. 35, 72–73 (1998). See generally 6 The Biblical and “Scientific” De-
fense of Slavery: Religion and “The Negro Problem” (John David Smith ed., 1993). 
In California, as in other states, the concept of race simply became a shorthand means for 
describing “a distinct people [Chinese], living in our community, . . . differing in language, 
opinions, color, and physical conformation; between whom and ourselves nature has placed an 
impassable difference.” People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404–05 (1854) (holding that the phrase “No 
Black, or Mulatto person, or Indian” included “all races other than the Caucasian”). 
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If defined in scientific terms, “sexual orientation” is emphatically 
not a social or political construct. If defined as “refer[ring] to one’s 
pattern of erotic responsiveness . . . androphilic (attracted to men), gy-
nephilic (attracted to women), or bisexual (attracted to both),”129 it de-
scribes real, and (sometimes) measurable physical phenomena.130 Nor 
is “sex” a social or political construct if (and only if) it is used to “re-
fer to the biological variables that can be described as either male or 
female (e.g., genes, chromosomes, gonads, internal and external geni-
tal structures).”131 
The issues being debated in the same-sex-marriage cases are thus 
rooted in real and substantial differences of opinion on the meaning 
of human nature and the relevance of a whole host of disputed scien-
tific terms, social phenomena, research efforts, and empirical data. 
Also in debate are the meaning and utility (both individual and social) 
of hotly contested social categories, like LGBT (and all of its vari-
ants), “straight,” “homosexual,” “gender,” “gender identity,” “sexual 
preference,” and “gender role.”  
There is a disagreement here. The Equal Protection Clause pro-
vides no authority for the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve it as a mat-
ter of constitutional law. 
VI. Conclusion 
The same-sex-marriage cases invite the courts to cut off a political 
debate over the wisdom of communal affirmation of same-sex and al-
ternative intimate relationships that grows more robust by the hour. 
If the Court accepts the invitation of the lower courts to require 
Congress and the states to affirm the proposition that all (or nearly 
all) forms of intimate relationships are entitled to the same communal 
affirmation as monogamous, conjugal relations between a man and a 
woman, the cost will be another round of bitter litigation over the 
meaning of political equality. 
It may seem obvious, but the point bears repeating: All parties to 
the debate over same-sex marriage are natural persons (or associa-
tions of natural persons) who have equal rights to express their views 
and to seek redress of their respective grievances. It makes no differ-
 
 129. Byne, supra note 33, at 950. 
 130. See Chivers et al., supra note 33. 
 131. Byne, supra note 33, at 950. 
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ence for constitutional purposes whether those grievances are di-
rected against state laws defining marriage as the monogamous rela-
tionship of one man and one woman (as in the Marriage Cases and the 
lawsuits against the Defense of Marriage Act), or if they are directed 
against the decision of a state supreme court that seeks to remove the 
issue from the political process (as in the case of Proposition 8 or the 
Hawaii constitutional amendment overturning Baehr v. Lewin). All 
parties to the debate have an equal right to participate, to influence 
representatives, to “count noses,” and to prevail if they can muster 
the votes to do so. 
But there are two things they cannot do in this debate among the 
People concerning the wisdom and morality of defining “marriage” 
as the union of one man and one woman. The first is to have any lev-
el of government cut off the debate by declaring that their opponents 
are the functional equivalent of ignorant racists whose speech and as-
sociational rights can be limited because of the content or perspective 
of their speech or expressive conduct. The second is to compel affir-
mation of any idea, relationship, or status unless it is recognized in 
the text of the Constitution itself. 
Writing for the Court in Zorach v. Clauson, Justice William O. 
Douglas observed: 
 We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. 
We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the 
spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on 
the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group 
and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and 
the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious in-
struction . . . it follows the best of our traditions. For it then re-
spects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the 
public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not 
would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the gov-
ernment show a callous indifference to religious groups. That 
would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those 
who do believe.132 
Justice Douglas’s point is profound. The Constitution requires 
that our government, including the President, the Court, the Con-
gress, and the states, “respect[] the religious nature of our people and 
 
 132. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952). 
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accommodate[] the public service to their spiritual needs.” Simply 
stated, this means that our government must take us—citizens, guests 
resident in our country, and people of other countries—as it finds us. 
If the structure of “heteronormativity” is to be dismantled, there 
is only one place to do it: at the ballot box. 
 
